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It Is up to Somalia to Combat Al-Shabab

Charles V. Peña

According to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), there have been 18
airstrikes to date this year in Somalia — more than four
times the average for the previous seven years. At the same time,
the number of U.S. forces inSomalia has more than doubled. The
target of the U.S. military inSomalia is al-Shabab, an Islamist
militant group allied with al Qaeda and now considered the
deadliest terrorist organization in Africa.

The Islamic State (ISIS) has also established a small presence
inSomalia and a break-away group of al-Shabab has pledged
allegiance to ISIS, but the two groups are more in competition with
each other for influence in Somalia — which demonstrates that
radical Islam is not monolithic.

Certainly, al-Shabab is a threat to the Somali government and
the civilians killed by its attacks. The worst attack was in
October when a truck bomb packed with several hundred kilograms of
military grade, homemade explosives was used to kill more than 300
people and injure hundreds more in the city center of Mogadishu
— making it one of the deadliest terrorist attacks anywhere
in the world.

The data does not bear
out the logic that killing would-be terrorists overseas in places
like Somalia will make us inherently safer.

According to the U.S. mission in Somalia, “Such cowardly
attacks reinvigorate the commitment of the United States to assist
our Somali and African Union partners to combat the scourge of
terrorism.” But an amorphous “scourge of
terrorism” — especially in Somalia — is not a
direct threat to America that warrants the sacrifice of U.S. lives
— such as U.S. Navy SEAL Senior Chief Kyle Milliken, who was
killed on a mission inSomalia in early May.

Yet, every radical Islamist everywhere in the world is not a
direct threat to the United States. ISIS is primarily a threat in
Iraq and Syria. Boko Haram is a threat in Nigeria. al-Shabab is a
threat inSomalia. As such, it is up to those countries and their
neighbors — who are most imperiled and have the most to lose
— to take primary responsibility for combating the terrorist
threats in their own backyards.

More important, we must recognize that the threat that al-Shabab
really represents is the civil war raging within Islam. Ultimately,
al-Shabab — like al Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram — is at
war with its fellow Muslims who do not agree with and do not want
to live by their radical version of Islam. Involving the U.S.
military only puts us in the middle of their civil war — U.S.
troops should stop terrorists from killing Americans, not from
killing each other.

And as brutally violent as al-Shabab is, it is not targeting
America as al Qaeda did on Sept. 11, 2001.

Indeed, since 9/11 there hasn’t been a successful attack by a
foreign terrorist organization. The real threat has been lone wolf
and largely homegrown terrorism.

According to the Global Terrorism Index, since 2006, 98 percent
of all deaths from terrorism in the U.S. have been from attacks
carried out by lone actors, resulting in 156 deaths. And according
to the New America Foundation, of those accused of jihadist related
terrorism crimes in the U.S., more than 80 percent of them were
either U.S. citizens or U.S. legal residents, and about half were
American born citizens.

The data does not bear out the logic that killing would-be
terrorists overseas in places likeSomalia will make us inherently
safer. So continuing to pursue such a strategy is folly.

In 1993, the U.S. military was inSomalia on a humanitarian
intervention mission that was neither vital nor important to U.S.
national security. The mission resulted in the tragic deaths of 18
U.S. Army Rangers. Today, the U.S. military is inSomalia to help
Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo wage a war against
al-Shabab — a war neither vital nor important to U.S.
national security. If the first time was simply a tragedy, the
second time is foolhardy.

Charles V.
Peña
, a senior fellow with Defense Priorities, is the
former director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute and
author of “Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on
Terrorism” (Potomac Books).